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Abstract
We prove that quantum key distribution is secure against several types of attacks within the framework
of classical knowledge knowledge for quantum systems, a formal model which was developed in [8]. In
particular we rephrase security as a logical property and use meta-logic reasoning on the ﬁnite state machine
corresponding to the quantum key distribution protocol. While these security issues have been studied
before, it is the logical-based approach that is original here.
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1 Introduction
Quantum computation proved to be very inﬂuential in the area of quantum cryp-
tography, with two of the earliest and best-known applications in this area: Shor’s
algorithm for factoring prime numbers [23] and quantum key distribution (QKD) [2].
In this paper we initiate the investigation of quantum cryptography through for-
mal methods. In particular we exhibit a preliminary analysis of the security of
QKD against several types of attacks through meta-logic reasoning. This type of
cryptanalysis is much needed since, similar to the situation with classical security
protocols, there have been quantum protocols designed and proved to be safe in
theory, only for their attacks to be found and their security proofs violated later, ei-
ther by further theoretical analysis or by taking implementation issues into account.
The problem is that while cryptography provides precise mathematical deﬁnitions
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of particular protocols and their security, these deﬁnitions are usually at a low level
of abstraction. This makes it hard to analyse diﬀerent protocols systematically and
see how properties evolve when protocols are combined. Also, it is diﬃcult to gauge
how well these deﬁnitions capture the realities of an actual implementation. Formal
methods, on the other hand, are based on well-deﬁned protocol languages which
support a systematic presentation of protocols and properties. Most importantly,
they provide tool support for automated proof techniques. Such tools are particu-
larly useful for analysis of distributed protocols (and thus cryptography), for which
proofs are particularly tedious and error-prone if done by hand.
Formal analysis is a necessity still for QKD, even though the quantum commu-
nity considers its security analysis as a solved problem. This is because a mathe-
matical proof on the theoretical security of QKD does not guarantee actual security
in a practical setting. Hardware issues are not captured in theoretical proofs, and
these are important in security, as they can result in backdoors for breaking the
system (an example is the so-called timing attack for RSA). Formal methods are
more ﬂexibly adapted to these situations and hence can cover a range of diﬀerent
situations.
Concretely we rely on a two-level approach. At the base level the protocol to
be analysed is speciﬁed in the language of quantum networks [4], a protocol speci-
ﬁcation language for distributed quantum computations with evaluation rules and
a formal semantics. On top of this we have a epistemic-temporal logical framework
suitable for meta-logic analysis of the protocol under consideration, ﬁrst developed
in [8]. The idea of developing formal models to reason about knowledge has proved
to be very useful for distributed systems [16,15,12]. Epistemic logic provides a nat-
ural framework for expressing the knowledge of agents in a network, allowing one
to make quite complex statements about what agents know, what they know that
other agents know, and so on. Moreover, combining epistemic with temporal logic,
one can investigate how knowledge evolves over time in distributed protocols, which
is useful both for program analysis as well as formal veriﬁcation. Whereas the afore-
mentioned earlier developments were deﬁned independent of cryptographic issues,
an important realisation is that cryptographic properties can be recast in terms of
knowledge. Indeed in cryptography many issues, such as security and identiﬁcation,
are all about knowledge. For example, can an agent learn about the presence of
an eavesdropper, or can an agent be sure the protocol’s goal has been achieved?
Reasoning about knowledge is a platform from which one can investigate these and
other cryptographic issues in an intuitive yet systematic way.
Research into formal methods for distributed quantum computation is relatively
recent and hence not very proliﬁc. Several formal languages for protocol speciﬁca-
tion were developed, either in the ﬂavour of classical process calculi [17,13,4] or in
terms of dynamic logic [1]. Some of these frameworks have been augmented with
logical tools for protocol analysis: both [14] and [8] use meta-logic reasoning to
assert correctness properties on top of non-logical base language, though only the
latter deﬁnes epistemic operators. In fact knowledge for quantum distributed sys-
tems was deﬁned earlier in [24] independently of a protocol speciﬁcation language.
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However, as we explain in more detail in Sec. 3, a more suitable notion of knowledge,
which is essentially classical, is the one developed in [8]. Epistemic extensions of
models based on dynamic logic are evidently more natural: here there is the work
in [21,22], which mostly concerns the analysis of classical security protocols but has
been applied to quantum systems as well. Note however that this algebraic 1-level
approach is very diﬀerent from the 2-level model-checking techniques for protocol
analysis mentioned above. While any model that allows protocol analysis can in
principle be applied in a cryptographic setting, none of the works mentioned above
proposes an applicable formal framework for automatic cryptanalysis of quantum
protocols.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Sec. 2, the protocol of quantum key
distribution is explained. This is at the same time a leading example to familiarise
the reader with distributed quantum networks, a speciﬁcation language with for-
mal semantics for distributed quantum computations which we use throughout this
paper. Next, we discuss the logical framework operating on top of this, including
modal operators for time and knowledge, in Sec. 3. We note that though we deﬁne
knowledge in terms of quantum networks, our deﬁnition holds more generally in any
agent-based system for describing distributed quantum computations. In Sec. 4 we
analyse QKD and its security through meta-logic reasoning, covering several types
of attacks. Finally, we conclude in Sec. 5. This paper assumes some familiarity with
quantum computation and reasoning about knowledge – for the reader not familiar
with these domains, we refer to the excellent [19] and [12]. The present paper is a
continuation of earlier work by the authors [4,7,8]. We present only the basics of
this earlier work here, and refer the reader to the references cited above for more
detailed explanations.
2 Quantum key distribution
The goal of quantum key distribution is to establish a shared secret key between
two parties, traditionally called Alice and Bob. There are three versions of the
standard QKD protocol, all of which are equivalent [2,10,3]. We will adhere to
Ekert’s incarnation of the QKD protocol [10] throughout this paper.
The protocol.
QKD is a private key distribution protocol that is secure against eavesdrop-
pers [18]. It relies crucially on the properties of the Bell state |Φ〉 given by
|ΦAB〉 = |0A0B〉+ |1A1B〉√
2
, (1)
and distributed among agents A (Alice) and B (Bob) as indicated by the indices.
The Bell state has the property that when measured in arbitrary but identical bases
by Alice and Bob, both of them are guaranteed to obtain identical measurement
outcomes. For the rectangular basis {|0〉, |1〉} this follows from the expression above.
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In QKD in particular we also measure in the diagonal basis {|+〉, |−〉}. When
expressing |Φ〉 with respect to this basis we obtain
|ΦAB〉 = |+A +B〉+ | −A −B〉√
2
, (2)
from which follows that also in this basis Alice and Bob will obtain identical mea-
surement outcomes. QKD is based on this property, along with the fact that no-one
— including Alice and Bob — can predict which of both measurement outcomes, 0
(when collapsing to |0〉 or |+〉) or 1 (when collapsing to |1〉 or |−〉) they will obtain.
While the above explanation suﬃces quantum-mechanically, we need a more
formal notation to investigate the protocol computationally. In our case we denote
the full speciﬁcation of one step of the protocol as follows.
QKD =A(a) : {1}.[(c!a)(c?b).M1Ha1 ]
|B(b) : {2}.[(c?a)(c!b).M2Hb2]
‖E12 .
(3)
We call such a speciﬁcation a network. The concept of distributed quantum net-
works, as well as the accompanying syntax and semantics, was deﬁned in [4,6].
The syntax for networks is a mix of classical process calculi syntax, the measure-
ment calculus (an assembly language for one-way quantum computations [5]), and
newly deﬁned syntax for notions particular to the setting of distributed quantum
computations. For classical process calculi concepts we use familiar notation: con-
currency | and classical message receiving c! and sending c?. Note that agents in
a network need to have diﬀerent names, since they correspond to diﬀerent parties
that make up the distributed system. In other words, concurrency comes only from
distribution; we do not consider parallel composition of processes in the context of
one party. The measurement calculus is used for local quantum operations: in the
above, measurement of the i-th qubit Mi, Hadamard operation on the i-th qubit Hi;
note that operations are read right to left. We overload that notation slightly here
by writing Hai , which means that execution of the Hadamard gate is conditioned
on the value of a Boolean variable a (if a = 0, do nothing, otherwise apply H).
This is also reﬂected in the name of the agents, for example A(a) means that A
is parameterised by this Boolean variable a. Finally, we need to add syntax for
shared quantum resources such as the Bell state in the above. These resources are
supposed to be available to each agent at the start of the computation, and because
of entanglement cannot be incorporated in each agent’s speciﬁcation. The notation
we use is ‖E12, which should be read as given the Bell state over qubits 1 and 2.
Furthermore, our agents are typed. Agent types, denoted in curly braces, specify
how quantum resources are distributed amongst agents. In the above, the fact that
Alice owns the ﬁrst qubit of the Bell state is denoted by A(a) : {1}, likewise Bob
owns the second as speciﬁed by B(b) : {2}. So to summarise, one can read the net-
work QKD as follows. At the network level, we have two agents A and B, acting
in parallel on a shared quantum state given by E12. At the agent level, agent A
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(B) is parameterised by a Boolean variable a (b) and owns qubit 1 (2) , to which it
applies the local quantum operation M1Ha1 (M2H
b
2). After this A and B exchange
the values of a and b by classical message passing.
A further part to the protocol, which is at the moment not captured in our net-
work deﬁnition above, is that Alice and Bob only keep their measurement outcomes
after checking that a = b. Only in this case it is guaranteed that Alice’s measure-
ment outcome, which we denote s1, equals that of Bob, denoted s2. These values
are then kept as part of a secret key shared between Alice and Bob. A secret key of
adequate length is established by iterating this protocol many times. We note that
we could easily express these extra parts of the protocol in our framework; however,
we chose conciseness over completeness, as it is the core functionality of one step of
the protocol which we wish to analyse in this work.
Formal semantics.
A formal semantics for quantum networks — small-step, operational and de-
notational — was worked out in [4,7]. It is only the small-step semantics that
is of concern to us here. The small-step transitions for distributed computations
essentially describe how agents, and the network with them, evolve over diﬀerent
time steps. It is speciﬁed by a set of rules that apply consistently to any network
deﬁnition. An arbitrary network N is of the following form,
N = A1 : Q1.E1 | A2 : Q2.E2 . . . | Am : Qm.Em ‖σ , (4)
where each event sequence is a composition of measurement patterns P and com-
munication primitives c!, c?, qc! and qc?(classical and quantum). As a network
is executed agents carry out local operations and send out messages, aﬀecting the
network quantum state as well as each agent’s local state Γi, which is a classical
memory recording measurement outcomes and classical variable bindings. The state
of the complete network at a particular point in its execution is captured in a con-
ﬁguration C, which is given by a quantum state σ together with a set of agent
programs and their states, speciﬁcally
C = σ ‖Γ1,A1 : Q1.E1 | Γ2,A2 : Q2.E2 | . . . | ΓmAm : Qm.Em . (5)
Note that the the quantum and classical states σ and Γi, qubit types Qi and event
sequences Ei in the above are generally not equal to those in the network deﬁnition
(4), as it is precisely these elements that change during execution. The initial
conﬁguration, however, is in fact almost identical to the network deﬁnition, diﬀering
only in the instantiation of empty local states ∅ for each agent.
To state the rules of the semantics we adopt a shorthand notation for agents, as
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follows,
ai = Ai : Qi.Ei
ai.E = Ai : Qi.[Ei.E]
a−q = A : Q\{q}.E
a+q = A : Q unionmulti {q}.E [q/x] ,
(6)
where E is any event, and Ei and E ′i are event sequences. The small-step rules for
conﬁguration transitions, denoted =⇒, are speciﬁed below; we give some explana-
tions afterwards.
σ,P(V, I,O,A) −→λ σ′,Γ′
σ ‖Γ,A : I unionmultiR.[E .P] =⇒λ σ′ ‖Γ∪ Γ′,A : O unionmultiR.E
(7)
Γ2(y) = v
σ ‖Γ1,a1.c?x | Γ2,a2.c!y =⇒ σ ‖Γ1[x → v],a1 | Γ2,a2 (8)
σ ‖Γ1,a1.qc?x | Γ2,a2.qc!q =⇒ σ ‖Γ1,a+q1 | Γ2,a−q2
(9)
L =⇒λ R
L | L′ =⇒λ R | L′ (10)
Here ∪ denotes the union of outcome maps. Implicit in these rules is a sequential
composition rule, which ensures that all events in an agent’s event sequence are
executed one after the other. The ﬁrst rule is for local operations, which are speci-
ﬁed by patterns in the measurement calculus [5]. We have written the full pattern
instead of only its command sequence here to make pattern input and output ex-
plicit. Because a pattern’s big-step semantics is given by a probabilistic transition
system described by −→, we pick up a probability λ here. The full speciﬁcation of
the small-step rules for patterns can be found in the appendix. Note that an agent
changes its sort depending on the pattern’s output O. The next rule is for classical
rendezvous and is straightforward. For quantum rendezvous, we need to substitute
q for x in the event sequence of the receiving agent, and furthermore adapt qubit
sorts. The last rule is a metarule, which is required to express that any of the other
rules may ﬁre in the context of a larger system. L and R stand for any of the pos-
sible left-, respectively right-hand sides of any of the previous rules, while L′ is an
arbitrary conﬁguration. Note that we might need to rearrange terms in the parallel
composition of agents in order to be able to apply the context rule. This can always
be done since the order of agents in a conﬁguration is arbitrary. In derivations of
network execution, we often do not explicitly write reductions as speciﬁed by (10),
but rather specify in which order the other rules ﬁre in the context of the network
at hand. It is precisely in this last rule that introduces nondeterminism at the net-
work level, that is, several agent transitions may be possible within the context of
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a network at the same time.
Execution of QKD.
Let us now apply the formal semantics for networks to the particular case of
QKD. This is done by applying the rules of the semantics to the network deﬁnition
given in (3). By going through the protocol step by step one constructs all conﬁgu-
rations that potentially occur during the execution of QKD; it is this conﬁguration
space, denoted CN for a network N , that we reason upon for cryptanalysis.
The initial conﬁguration for QKD is simply
C0(a, b) = E12 ‖∅,A(a) : {1}.[(c!a)(c?b).M1Ha1 ] | ∅,B(b) : {2}.[(c?a)(c!b).M2Hb2]
Here ∅ denotes the empty local state, i.e. no variables or measurement outcomes
are stored initially. Note that conﬁgurations are parameterised by the values of a
and b. 3 Jumping to the conﬁguration where both agents have carried out their local
quantum operation and obtained measurement outcomes j1 and j2, we have
C1(a, b) = 0 ‖ [s1 → j1],A(a).[(c!a)(c?b)] | [s2 → j2],B(b).[(c?a)(c!b)] .
The network quantum state is now the null state 0 and types have disappeared
because measurements in patterns are destructive. Obviously we have branching
due to varying measurement outcomes, and this with speciﬁc probabilities. In the
ﬁnal step of the computation agents have added the values of b, respectively a in
their local states; the associated conﬁguration C2(a, b) is given by
C2(a, b) = 0 ‖ [s1 → j1, b → b],A(a) | [s2 → j2, a → a],B(b) ,
where a and b are variable names. Schematically we have two possible structures
of conﬁguration trees for QKD, two of each type. These are represented in Fig. 3
(ignore the boxes for now) for a = b or a 	= b respectively. Here we have not written
the dependency of each conﬁguration on a and b explicitly to avoid cluttering the
picture. Our conﬁguration trees are slightly cruder than the ones taking all steps
of the protocol into account because we allow the quantum operations to be carried
out in parallel by Alice and Bob. This is because we are interested in the value of
the secret key and how an eavesdropper can learn this value, and hence, since the
order in which local quantum operations are carried out does not matter, 4 we can
make this simpliﬁcation.
3 Reasoning about knowledge
In this section we explain the notion of knowledge for distributed quantum systems,
which was deﬁned earlier in [8]. Our results are phrased in the context of quantum
3 We could have modelled setting up the values of a and b within our protocol as well; again, we have
chosen not to do so for simplicity.
4 This just follows from the mathematical identity L1 ⊗ L2 = (I ⊗ L2)(L1 ⊗ I) = (L1 ⊗ I)(I ⊗ L2), where
L1 and L2 are local operations.
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networks, but in fact our notion of knowledge is model-independent. That is to say,
any agent-based model for distributed quantum computation would beneﬁt from
knowledge as deﬁned below, or slight adaptations thereof.
Facts.
Before we can actually deﬁne modal operators for knowledge or time, we need to
clarify what the propositions are that these act upon. It is not our intention to deﬁne
a full-ﬂedged language for primitive propositions; rather, we deﬁne these abstractly,
and specify the usual rules for combining them with standard logical connectives.
We do give some examples of the kinds of properties that we are interested in later
on.
Each network N determines a set of conﬁgurations CN that can potentially
occur during execution of N . An interpretation of N is a truth-value assignment
to all conﬁgurations in CN for some basic set of primitive propositions θ. Writing
I(C, θ) for the interpretation of fact θ in conﬁguration C, we then have a ﬁrst logical
statement,
C,N  θ ⇐⇒ I(C, θ) = true . (11)
The primitive propositions considered usually depend on the network under study,
and are currently speciﬁed individually for each application. Typical primitive
propositions encountered are the following, where we use slightly ad-hoc logical
notation,
C,N  (x = v) ⇐⇒ ∃i.Γi(x) = v (12)
C,N  (x = y) ⇐⇒ ∃i, j.Γi(x) = Γj(y) (13)
C,N  (Ai has q) ⇐⇒ q ∈ Qi (14)
C,N  (q1 . . . qn = σ) ⇐⇒ q1 . . . qn = σ (15)
C,N  (qi = qj) ⇐⇒ ∃σ.qi = qj = σ . (16)
The ﬁrst two lines concern classical variable value and variable equality. The third
line is about qubit ownership. The last two lines are genuine quantum statements,
and need to be used with care, in that they only make sense when pertaining to
known quantum states. That is, σ should be seen as a preparation or a state that
has just been measured, not as an unknown quantum input such as that appearing
in teleportation. The last primitive proposition is especially tailored to unknown
quantum states: it states that two qubits named qi and qj are equal, though the
actual state they are in may be unspeciﬁed; this is something we need to be able
to express for the teleportation protocol, for example. We also allow functions init
and ﬁn for taking the initial and ﬁnal values of a variable or quantum state. These
formulas are currently deﬁned in an ad-hoc manner.
Composite formulas can be constructed from primitive propositions and the
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usual logical connectives ∧, ∨ and ¬. Concretely, we have the following rules.
C,N  θ1 ∧ θ2 ⇐⇒ C  θ1 ∧ C  θ2 (17)
C,N  θ1 ∨ θ2 ⇐⇒ C  θ1 ∨ C  θ2 (18)
C,N  ¬θ ⇐⇒ C  θ . (19)
Hence the syntax for facts F is as follows,
F ::= θ | F ∧ F ′ | F ∨ F ′ | ¬F . (20)
Knowledge.
The standard approach to knowledge representation in multi-agent systems is
based on the possible worlds model [16,15,12]. The idea is that there exists a set of
worlds such that an agent may consider several of these to be possible. An agent
knows a fact if it is true in all the worlds it considers possible; this is expressed by
epistemic modal operators acting on some basic set of propositions. The ﬂexibility
of this approach lies in the fact that there are many ways in which one can specify
possibility relations. In a distributed system, worlds correspond to global conﬁgu-
rations occurring in a particular protocol, and possible worlds are determined by an
equivalence relation over these conﬁgurations. Typically, global network conﬁgura-
tions are considered equivalent by an agent if its local view on these conﬁgurations
is identical.
A ﬁrst attempt to deﬁne knowledge for quantum distributed systems is found
in [24]. Therein, two diﬀerent notions of knowledge are deﬁned. First, an agent i
can classically know a formula θ to hold, denoted Kci θ; in this case the possibility
relation is based on equality of local classical states. Second, an agent can quantumly
know a formula to hold, denoted Kqi θ. For the latter, the possibility relation is based
on equality of reduced density matrices for that agent. The authors argue that Kqi
is an information-theoretic idealisation of knowledge, in that the reduced density
matrix embodies what an agent, in principle, could determine from its local quantum
state. However, there are two main problems with this approach. The ﬁrst is that
one cannot assume that the reduced density matrix is always known, because in
quantum mechanics, observing a state alters it irreversibly. So, knowledge does not
consist of possession of a quantum state: it is not because an agent has a qubit
in its lab that the agent knows anything about it. Indeed, consider the situation
where a qubit has just been sent from A to B. Then B knows nothing about its
newly acquired qubit – it is possible, even, that A knows more about it than B
does. The second problem with the above approach is that one loses information
on correlations between agents by considering only the reduced density matrix, a
crucial ingredient in distributed quantum primitives.
What we need is a proper notion of knowledge, which captures the information
an agent can obtain about its quantum state. This includes the following ingre-
dients: ﬁrst, an agent knows states that it has prepared; second, an agent knows
a state when it has just measured it; and third, an agent may obtain knowledge
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by classical communication of one of the above. While knowledge of preparation
states is automatically contained in the description of the protocol, our notion of
equivalence precisely captures the latter two items. As we shall see below, in doing
this we ﬁnd a similar notion as Kci θ. Our main argument, then, is that there is no
such thing as quantum knowledge in the sense of Kqi θ; rather knowledge is about
classically knowing facts about quantum systems. To stress this we refer to our
notion in full as classical knowledge for quantum systems. 5
Hence in order to deﬁne knowledge, we need to deﬁne an equivalence relation
on conﬁgurations for each of the agents, embodying what an agent knows about
the global conﬁguration from its own information only. We deliberately do not say
local information here, as, via the network preparation, an agent may also have
non-local information under the form of correlations at its disposal. Each agent’s
equivalence relation has to reﬂect what an agent knows about the network state, the
execution of the protocol and the results of measurements. All classical information
an agent has is stored in its local state Γ; this includes measurement outcomes
and classical values passed on by other agents. Just like in classical distributed
systems, an agent can certainly diﬀerentiate conﬁgurations for which the local state
is diﬀerent. As for quantum information, an agent knows which qubits it owns,
what local operations it applies on these qubits, and, moreover, what (non-local)
preparation state it starts out with, i.e. what entanglement it shares with other
agents initially. All of the above information is in fact captured by an agent’s event
sequence in a particular conﬁguration, together with its local state. Therefore, we
obtain the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 3.1 Given a network N and conﬁgurations C = σ ‖ |iΓi,Ai : Qi.Ei and
C ′ = σ′ ‖ |iΓ′i,Ai : Q′i.E ′i in CN , we say that agent Ai considers C and C ′ to be
equivalent, denoted C ∼i C ′, if Γi = Γ′i and Ei = E ′i. For each agent Ai the relation
∼i is an equivalence relation on CN , called the possibility relation of Ai.
Via possibility relations we can now deﬁne what it means for an agent Ai to
know a fact θ in a conﬁguration C in the usual way,
C,N  Kiθ ⇐⇒ ∀C ′ ∼i C : C ′  θ . (21)
Our choice of equivalence embodies that agents cannot distinguish conﬁgurations if
they only diﬀer in that other agents have applied local operations to their qubits;
neither can they if other agents have exchanged messages with each other. This
situation is represented schematically in Fig. 1. While the global network state
does change as a result of local operations, an agent not executing these has no
knowledge of this, and no way of obtaining it. This is precisely what we capture
with the relation ∼i.
5 Note that is diﬀerent from the terminology used in [8], where we talk about quantum knowledge.
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L1
L2
C1 C2 C3 C4
Fig. 1. A schematic event diagram with equivalence classes.
Time.
One typically also wants to investigate how knowledge evolves during a compu-
tation, for example due to communication between agents. We use the approach
of computational tree logic (CTL) [11] to formalise time-related logical statements,
providing state as well as path modal operators. The reason for this is that, due
to the fact that quantum networks typically have a branching structure, we need
to be able to express statements concerning all paths as well as those pertaining to
some paths. Concretely, we introduce the traditional temporal state operators 
(“always”) and  (“eventually”) into our model, and combine these with the path
operators A (“for all paths”) and E (“there exists a path”), as follows 6
C,N  Aθ ⇐⇒ ∀γ,∀C ′ with C γ=⇒ C ′ : C ′  θ (22)
C,N  Eθ ⇐⇒ ∃γ,∀C ′ with C γ=⇒ C ′ : C ′  θ (23)
C,N  Aθ ⇐⇒ ∀γ,∃C ′ with C γ=⇒ C ′ : C ′  θ (24)
C,N  Eθ ⇐⇒ ∃γ,∃C ′ with C γ=⇒ C ′ : C ′  θ . (25)
Obviously, we have that any formula with A implies the corresponding one with E,
and likewise any formula with  implies the corresponding one with .
Properties.
The properties we wish to express about protocols are constructed from the in-
gredients above: facts, logical connectives, and modal operators of time and knowl-
edge. Concretely, a property P is generated from the following syntax
P ::= F | KiP | AP | EP | AP | EP , (26)
where the syntax for facts is given in (20).
When investigating knowledge issues in a distributed system, one naturally ar-
rives at situations where one needs to describe formally how knowledge evolves as
the computation proceeds. This can be done adequately by combining knowledge
operators Ki with the temporal operators deﬁned above. As usual, one needs to
6 γ=⇒ is the closure of the small-step transition relation =⇒ deﬁned in [8]. That is, we have C γ=⇒ C′ if
C′ can be reached form C by a series of consecutive small-step transitions, speciﬁed by the path γ.
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proceed with caution when doing this, since it is not always intuitively clear what
the meaning of each of these diﬀerent combinations is. For example, it is generally
not the case that the formula AKiθ is equivalent to KiAθ. Typically, we want
to prove things that are always known by an agent, no matter what branch the
protocol follows; this is embodied by the former, and represented schematically in
Fig. 2. In the ﬁgure the arrows represent the equivalence relation ∼i and the circled
points are those for which θ should hold.
C
Fig. 2. A schematic representation of C,N AKiθ.
4 Security issues for QKD
With epistemic and temporal notions for quantum networks in place, we are ready
to evaluate quantum key distribution and its security from a knowledge-based per-
spective.
Fig. 3 pictures the equivalence classes of conﬁgurations for Alice (dotted boxes)
and Bob (boxes) respectively. Equivalence across both trees holds for Alice for a
ﬁxed, and for Bob for b ﬁxed. Vertically, each level is discerned by each agent
because a local event has occurred, while horizontally, diﬀerent measurement out-
comes ensure the non-equivalence of conﬁgurations. Note that at each time step
all conﬁgurations in which say, Alice, has a particular measurement outcome are
C0
C1
00
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11
C2
00
C2
11
C0
C1
00
C1
11
C2
00
C2
11
C1
01
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10
C2
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C2
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1/21/2
1/4 1/4
1/4 1/4
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A      B
Fig. 3. Conﬁguration trees and equivalence classes.
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equivalent, i.e. this works across all conﬁguration trees with the same value for a.
More formally, we have the following two equivalence classes of conﬁgurations for
Alice at level 1, one for each value of s1,
[Cs11 (a)]A = {∀b, s2 : Cs1s21 (a, b)} . (27)
At the ﬁnal level Alice and Bob have interchanged the values of a and b and so they
can tell the diﬀerence between a number of conﬁgurations that were equivalent at
the previous level. Concretely we move to a set of equivalence classes for Alice as
follows,
[Cs12 (a, b)]A = {∀s2 : Cs1s22 (a, b)} . (28)
Bob has analogous equivalence classes [Cs21 (b)]B and [C
s2
2 (a, b)]B, which are deﬁned
as the above but with the roles of a and b and of s1 and s2 interchanged.
When a = b Alice and Bob have identical single-conﬁguration equivalence classes
at the ﬁnal stage of the computation. This means that each agent’s knowledge is
identical at that point, and that we can prove formally that in this case one bit of
a secret key has been established,
a = b ⇒ C0(a, b), QKD  A(KA(s1 = s2) ∧KB(s1 = s2)) (29)
In this section we prove that QKD is secure against several types of attacks
within our logical framework of knowledge and time. While these security issues
have been studied before, it is the logical-based approach that is original here.
We head oﬀ by showing that eavesdroppers listening in on classical communication
channels cannot derive the key. This is of course the core property in making QKD
so valuable as an alternative to classical private symmetric secret key establishment
protocols.
Listening in on classic channels.
Suppose we have a third agent Eve, who eavesdrops on classical communication
between Alice and Bob. Formally, we can model this by adding a third agent E,
acting in parallel with A and B, to the QKD network given in (3), as follows,
. (30)
QKD =A(a) : {1}.[(c!a)(c?b).M1Ha1 ]
|B(b) : {2}.[(c?a)(c!b).M2Hb2]
|E.[(c!a, b)(c?a, b)]
‖E12 .
(31)
Note that Eve has no type since she has no qubits. The idea is that Eve intercepts
the messages sent by Alice and Bob, reads them, and sends them along so that
the other agents cannot detect her presence. However, neither can she derive any
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Fig. 4. Eve’s equivalence classes when a = b.
information about the key. This we know already from straightforward quantum
mechanics, but let us prove this now in our framework. By including Eve an extra
level is inserted in our conﬁguration trees, between level 1 and 2. Calling this level
1’, we thus obtain a number of new conﬁgurations C1′ that our agents can reason
upon. A representation of the a = b case is given in Fig. 4.
The crucial point is that, since the values of s1 and s2 remain local throughout
the protocol, 7 conﬁgurations with diﬀerent values for these parameters are equiv-
alent for Eve. In particular for i = 1′, 2 we ﬁnd the following equivalence classes
[Ci(a, b)]E = {∀s1, s2 : Cs1s2i (a, b)}. (32)
In other words, Eve can never derive the values of the secret key, since within
one equivalence class there will always be conﬁgurations corresponding to diﬀerent
measurement outcomes. More formally,
a = b ⇒ C0(a, b), QKD  A¬KE(s1 = s2 = v) (33)
where v is a value. Note, however, that Eve can derive that in this case measurement
outcomes for Alice and Bob are identical.
Measuring the Bell state.
A second possible attack is that Eve intercepts the Bell state before it is dis-
tributed among Alice and Bob, measuring it and resending it to Alice and Bob in
collapsed form. For simplicity, we assume that Eve always measures in the ordinary
basis. This situation would involve changing the speciﬁcation of the QKD network
given in (3), as follows,
QKD =A(a).[(c!a)(c?b).M1Ha1 (qc?1)]
|B(b).[(c?a)(c!b).M2Hb2(qc?2)]
|E.[(qc!1)(qc!2).M12]
‖E12 .
(34)
7 Local in the sense that they are not sent around directly.
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Note that Alice and Bob now have an empty type, as they receive their qubits at
the start of the computation from Eve (whom they assume to be a safe quantum
channel). The interesting case again is where a = b, and in particular a = b = 1
since Eve always uses the ordinary basis. In this case Alice and Bob may obtain
diﬀerent measurement outcomes even though they measure in the same basis. 8
Hence they can ﬁgure out that an attack has been attempted, and thus that their
network is not secure.
In our framework, again we have an extra level of conﬁgurations, this time right
after C0(a, b), where Eve measures and sends qubits 1 and 2. However, let us move
straight to the ﬁnal stage of the computation. Now we have the following ﬁnal
equivalence classes for Alice
[Cs12 (1, 1)]A = {∀s0, s2 : Cs0s1s22 }, (35)
where s0 is Eve’s measurement outcome. Indeed, since Eve’s and Bob’s measure-
ment outcomes are now uncorrelated with Alice’s, and they have not communicated
these values to Alice, she has no way of discerning between conﬁgurations where
her outcome s1 is ﬁxed but theirs is arbitrary. Thus the following statement holds:
C0(1, 1), QKD  A¬KA(s1 = s2) . (36)
While in this case Alice and Bob cannot derive whether or not their protocol was
safely executed, they can do so when they exchange their measurement outcomes
s1 and s2. In this case we have
C0(1, 1), QKD  EKA(s1 	= s2) , (37)
and hence they know without doubt that the security of their network was compro-
mised.
Entangling with the Bell state.
A third possibility is that Eve entangles herself with the Bell state shared by
Alice and Bob and operates on her qubit only. This is described by the following
network speciﬁcation, where A and B are deﬁned as before, O is an arbitrary
quantum operation (i.e. a completely positive map), and |ψ123〉 is an arbitrary
3-qubit state which behaves like the Bell state on the ﬁrst two qubits 9
QKD = A . . . |B . . . |E : {3}.O3‖|ψ123〉 . (38)
Suppose O implements some unitary U acting on qubit 3 only. Since measurement
statistics for Alice and Bob are unchanged, in the interesting case where a = b we
again have a situation as in Fig. 4, and hence (33) holds: Eve cannot derive the
secret key. Next, suppose O implements a measurement of some sort. Only if qubit
8 This is because we have |00〉 = 1
2
(|++〉+ |+−〉+ | −+〉+ | − −〉), and a similar expression for |11〉.
9 That is, the reduced density matrix of |ψ123〉 on the Hilbert space corresponding to the ﬁrst two qubits
equals the density matrix of the Bell state.
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Fig. 5. Eve’s equivalence classes when measuring her disentangled qubit.
3 is disentangled from the other two are the measurement statistics for Alice and
Bob unaltered. Supposing Eve measures in the last step of the computation, then
in this case with a = b, a ﬁnal level of conﬁgurations is added to the conﬁguration
tree at the left of Fig. 3, as pictured in Fig. 5. Since conﬁgurations with diﬀerent
values for the key are equivalent to Eve, again she cannot derive its value. Finally,
if Eve carries out a measurement but her qubit is entangled with qubits 1 and 2, the
measurement statistics are altered much in the way of Sec. 7 (only the probabilities
are diﬀerent). As we do not reason about probabilities, the analysis of that section
applies here as well.
5 Conclusion
We have applied the framework of classical knowledge for quantum systems [8] to
analyse the security of quantum key distribution with respect to several types of
attacks. Our main point was to show that such developments provide a suitably sys-
tematic yet transparent way of investigating cryptographic issues. Of course more
work needs to be done. In particular we would like to move to a more abstract level
in which we can investigate all types of attacks at once, parameterising over arbi-
trary adversary behaviour. This would entail reasoning about inﬁnite conﬁguration
spaces. In particular, it would be interesting to redo Mayers’ proof of unconditional
security for quantum key distribution [18], to identify prime logical concepts and
how they correspond to information-theoretic arguments used in the proof as is.
Note that this would require reasoning about multiple runs and probabilities, some-
thing for which we currently have no machinery. Surely the model needs to be put
further to the test, by investigating other cryptographic primitives and protocols.
In ongoing work [9] we are upgrading our model by merging two previous ap-
proaches to reasoning about knowledge in quantum security protocols: the model
checking approach exhibited here and the algebraic axiomatics of [22]. These two
approaches complement each other: while the latter enjoys a semiautomatic proof
search procedure, the former is equipped with a small-step operational semantics
for quantum computations. We are currently looking into what combination of both
models gets the best of both worlds.
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Appendix: The small-step semantics for measurement
patterns.
For completeness we state the small-step operational semantics of measurement
patterns here [5,6]. A pattern is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 5.1 A pattern P is given by a computation space V , pattern inputs I
and outputs O, ﬁnite sets with associated Hilbert spaces HV , HI and HO respec-
tively, and a ﬁnite sequence of commands A = Ak . . . A1, and is denoted
P(V, I,O.A) .
Commands are either entanglements Eij , measurements t[Mαi ]
s or corrections Xsi
or Zsi , where i, j ∈ V , α ∈ [0, 2π] and s, t ∈ Z2.
The small-step semantics for patterns is in one-to-one correspondence with the
diﬀerent commands of which a pattern command sequence is composed. Before we
can give the speciﬁc rules for E, M and C commands however, we have to specify
the semantics of their component objects, signals and angles. For this we need an
extra structure in which we can store and look up measurement outcomes. We
call this classical component the outcome map Γ. Formally it is a function from
the computation space V \O (recall that output qubits are never measured) to the
outcome space Z2, initialised to the empty map, denoted ∅. The idea is that when
qubit i is measured the result si is ﬁlled into the outcome map such that Γ(i) = si.
The resulting outcome map is denoted as Γ[si/i], which is the outcome map Γ
with an additional signal value si ﬁlled in for qubit i. Signals, which are sums of
measurement outcomes, are then evaluated by looking up the signal terms in Γ. The
outcome map is the equivalent of the information ﬂow vector from [20]. Together
with the quantum state ρ ∈ D(HV ) the outcome map forms the total state of a
computation. The computation state space S is therefore deﬁned as
S :=
⋃
V,O
D(HV )× ZW2 , (39)
where W ⊆ (V \O) can be any ﬁnite set of qubits.
Each of our commands acts on a pair (ρ,Γ) in the state space S. The semantics
of a signal s however, can be deﬁned solely with respect to the outcome map. We
ﬁnd the following evaluation rules for signals.
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Γ  0 ↓ 0 and Γ  1 ↓ 1 (40)
Γ  si ↓ Γ(i) (41)
Γ[v/si]  si ↓ v and Γ[v/si]  sj ↓ Γ(j) if i 	= j (42)
Γ  s ↓ v Γ  t ↓ u
Γ  s + t ↓ v ⊕ u (43)
Here ⊕ denotes addition in Z2.
Angles, which can have signal dependencies percolated through via dependent
measurements, are also purely classical. Values of signals are looked up in Γ via the
rule set for signals in order to determine the actual value of a measurement angle.
This procedure is summarised in the following rules.
Γ  α ↓ α (44)
Γ  s ↓ v Γ  t ↓ u
Γ  t[α]s ↓ (−1)v.α + u.π (45)
Γ  [α]s ↓ 0[α]s and Γ  t[α] ↓ t[α]0 (46)
Having deﬁned how signals and angles are evaluated, we can now move on to
the operational semantics of the basic commands. All of these commands operate
on the quantum state.
ρ,Γ, Eij −→ ∧Zijρ∧Zij ,Γ (47)
Γ  s ↓ v
ρ,Γ, Xsi −→ Xvi ρXvi ,Γ
(48)
Γ  s ↓ v
ρ,Γ, Zsi −→ Zvi ρZvi ,Γ
(49)
Γ  t[α]s ↓ β
ρ,Γ, t[Mαi ]s −→λ0 〈+β|i ρ |+β〉i,Γ[0/i]
, λ0 =
tr(|+β〉〈+β|i ρ)
trρ
(50)
Γ  t[α]s ↓ β
ρ,Γ, t[Mαi ]s −→λ1 〈−β|i ρ |−β〉i,Γ[1/i]
, λ1 =
tr(|−β〉〈−β|i ρ)
trρ
(51)
The ﬁrst three commands are purely quantum and straightforward. The measure-
ment commands are the only commands that aﬀect the quantum state as well as
the output map. First, the measurement angle has to be evaluated, which in turn
requires evaluating the X- and Z-signals by the previous sets of rules. Measurement
commands are also the only nondeterministic commands, as the measured qubit is
projected onto either |+α〉 or |−α〉 with transition probabilities as stated. Usually,
the convention is to renormalise the state after measurement, but we do not adhere
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to it here, as in this way the probability of reaching a given state can be read oﬀ its
norm, and moreover the overall treatment is simpler. We have presented these rules
here for density matrices; in pure state derivations we often use state transitions
for brevity. Speciﬁcally, for a pure state we have ρ = |ψ〉〈ψ|, which is mapped to
L|ψ〉〈ψ|L†, with L any of the entanglement, Pauli or projection operators above. A
pure state transition can then be alternatively speciﬁed as mapping |ψ〉 to L|ψ〉.
Finally, we need an evaluation rule for a composition of commands, as follows.
ρ,Γ, C1 −→λ ρ′,Γ′
ρ,Γ, C2C1 −→λ ρ′,Γ′, C2 (52)
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